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Endogenizing bidder’s choice in Financial Assets Auctions –  
An Experimental Investigation* 
 
Abstract 
 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the preferences of potential bidders in 
choosing between uniform and discriminatory auction pricing methods. Many financial 
assets, particularly government bonds, are issued in an auction. Uniform and 
discriminatory pricing constitute the two most popular mechanisms used in public 
auctions. Theoretical papers have not been able to provide an unequivocal preference of 
one mechanism over the other. This study investigates both bidder choice and the impact 
of that choice on the outcome of the auction by allowing bidders to choose between the 
two alternative systems. The majority of the bidders in the survey prefer uniform pricing. 
Those preferring uniform auctions tend to bid more aggressively than those preferring 
discriminatory. On average, the proceeds to the issuer were higher under the uniform 
price mechanism. 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: G1, F3 
Keywords: Uniform auction, discriminatory auction, Treasury bonds, T-bills   
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1. Introduction  
 
The impact of market design on the level of participation and prices in financial 
markets is a key issue in the literature on financial market micro-structure. A vast body of 
research focuses on this issue, particularly within the context of secondary financial 
markets.
1
 Our study, while part of this literature, deals with auction design in primary 
bond markets and its affect on participation and pricing. 
Many financial assets such as treasury bonds, corporate bonds and stocks are 
issued to the public via auctions. No consensus currently exists, either in the academic 
literature or in practice, as to the most appropriate method of pricing securities issued in 
auctions. The question whether uniform or discriminatory pricing should be used remains 
unresolved.
2
   
This study is the first to investigate in a controlled environment the connection 
between the design of the auction and its potential impact on the participation in the 
offering and its outcome. 
So far the academic literature in financial economics viewed the issuer of 
sovereign bonds as a monopolist and hence ignored the preferences of the buyers. While 
this view was more appropriate in the past where markets were more segmented, 
especially in less developed financial markets, it is less appropriate now when financial 
markets are more integrated and participants invest globally. For example, when 60% of 
                                                                        
1
 For a survey of the literature see Biais,  Glosten, and Spatt (2005) 
2
 In uniform price auctions (also known as single price auction), all bidders bidding above the market 
clearing price are awarded the entire amount, while those bidding at the clearing price are awarded on a 
pro-rata basis.  All winners pay the same price, the market clearing price, for the entire quantity that they 
are awarded, regardless of the price submitted on their bid. In a discriminatory price auction (also known as 
multiple- price or pay-as-you-bid auction), bidders bidding above the market clearing price are awarded 
their bids. Each bidder, however, pays the price/s submitted in the bid. 
 4 
Greece’s debt in the second quarter of 2005 was held by foreign investors (IMF report 
2006), it is hard to argue that the Greek’s Treasury can ignore the preferences of foreign 
institutional investors.
3
 
As barriers to investment in foreign countries decrease, investors have many 
options to choose from. A US based investor, for example, who is seeking to invest in 
AAA rated sovereign bonds, linked to the euro, can choose to participate in the German 
or French government bond auctions that use discriminatory price auction or in Finland’s  
auctions that use the uniform price mechanism. He also can choose to participate in the 
Italian government auctions that use both mechanism or buy Austrian bonds that use 
none of these auction methods (See Brenner, Galai and Sade, 2009). Though these bonds 
differ by their characteristics there is no doubt that one can find several which are close 
substitutes. In addition, it is important to note that auctions are not only used for 
sovereign debt, but also for the issuance of corporate debt. In Israel, for example, a 
particular corporation can sell its debt using a discriminatory auction or a uniform one. 
An investor can decide which bonds to purchase.  
 In this paper we try to understand if participants prefer (or care) about the 
particular market design; the discriminatory price auction or the uniform one. This paper 
analyzes the results of a survey conducted among potential bidders. It is essentially 
impossible to collect relevant data regarding bidders’ actions and their preferences for 
specific auction mechanisms, while controlling for other factors. Therefore, we surveyed 
potential bidders to learn about their preferences in choosing between alternative pricing 
mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first in which participants are 
                                                                        
3
 The IMF report also indicates that foreign investments in emerging markets have doubled from 2000 to 
2005. 
 5 
offered a choice, albeit simulated, between alternative multi-unit (identical) goods 
auction systems
4
.   
   We conducted a survey among a variety of potential bidders, including financial 
professionals, business students, MBAs with a few years of work experience and 
executive MBAs in seven countries (US, Israel, Norway, South Africa, Luxembourg, 
Switzerland and The Netherlands.)
5
 We initially received 220 qualified answers. Most 
surveys were conducted during 2004-5 (220 participants,) and our statistical results are 
mainly based on these surveys. A control group of 22 participants was used in a 
questionnaire given in March 2009.  The survey focused on their preference for either a 
uniform or a discriminatory price auction. 
  The main findings are: a) 90.9% of the participants are not indifferent with respect to 
the pricing rule of the auction. b)  65.5% of those with a definite preference prefer to 
participate in a uniform price auction. This finding transcends country of origin and 
educational/professional background (MBAs, executive MBAs, undergraduates or 
professionals) and gender. Not only are the participants in our study preferring, on 
average, the uniform price mechanism, they also submit more aggressive bids under the 
uniform price mechanism (consistent with previous experimental work) and as result they 
are willing to pay, on average, a higher price. We do not investigate the reasons for their 
choices, but, concentrate on their revealed preferences as reflected in their answers. 
             Milton Friedman (1960) has argued that in the context of Treasury auctions, 
discriminatory pricing drives out uninformed participants because of the danger of over-
                                                                        
4
 There have been attempts, in the single unit auction literature, to empirically and experimentally examine 
bidder preferences among existing mechanisms and to theoretically incorporate the notion that issuers may 
need to compete for bidders. See, for example, Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004), McAfee (1993), Levin 
and Smith (1994). 
5
 All the university students that participated in our survey attended advance finance courses and have a 
background in economics and statistics. They came from more than 20 countries.  
 6 
bidding, the so-called “winner’s curse”. As a result, discriminatory pricing attracts the 
better informed, typically large players, and may be more susceptible to collusion than 
uniform pricing. Hence, he predicts that by limiting the pool of bidders, discriminatory 
auctions lead to lower proceeds from the offering. Our paper provides experimental 
support to Friedman's hypothesis. 
 More recent work in the theory of divisible-unit auctions investigates trade-offs  
that policy makers face in the deployment of alternative pricing mechanisms.
6
 These 
papers raise the following question: Given a set number of exogenous participants (N) at 
the time the rules are set, which mechanism will maximize proceeds from the auction? 
They show that a non-cooperative equilibrium exists under the uniform-price format, 
which supports collusive outcomes and is sub-optimal from the issuer’s standpoint. These 
theoretical studies also show that collusive outcomes are not evident in discriminatory 
auctions, in contrast to Friedman’s conjecture. They also claim that the uniform price 
mechanism may result in multiple equilibria.  
In sum, in the case of divisible units, the theory is inconclusive. Also, there is no 
consensus as to which of the two methods will generate larger proceeds. Thus, the choice 
of the auction mechanism remains an empirical issue. 
 There is a growing strand of research in experimental economics investigating 
divisible good auctions
7
. The methodology employed in this research enables us to 
compare alternative pricing mechanisms in a controlled environment. In these controlled 
                                                                        
6
 See, for example, Wilson (1979), Back and Zender (1993), Ausubel and Cramton (2002) and Wang and 
Zender (2002) for theoretical discussions on strategic bidding in multi-unit auctions. A survey article on 
auction theory by Das and Sundaram (1996) discusses the implications of theoretical models for Treasury 
securities auctions and presents some empirical evidence. 
7
 Starting from the early papers by Smith (1967), Miller and Plott (1985), Cox, Smith and Walker (1985) to 
the more recent papers by Goswami, Noe, and Rebello (1996) and Sade, Schnitzlein and Zender (2006). 
 7 
experiments, the number of participants in each mechanism was set in advance and 
bidders were asked to participate in a specific pre-determined auction.  
 While these experiments are able to gauge the potential impact of auction 
structure on pricing, the inability of participants to choose between the auctions may limit 
the applicability of these findings to financial markets. In actual auctions, the outcome 
depends on both price and participation. Hence, no conclusions can be drawn regarding 
the impact of the auction mechanism without considering the number of participating 
bidders for each of the alternative pricing systems.
8
  
Consistent with previous empirical research based on event studies our survey 
results suggest that by using the uniform price mechanism issuers may obtain higher 
revenues since the combination of the large number of bidders with their aggressive 
bidding strategies should yield larger proceeds .
9,10
 
 In addition to its contribution to the academic literature on auction mechanisms, 
our research has practical implications as well. Given that financial markets have become 
more global,
11
 issuers, including sovereign governments, seeking to attract global 
participation, can no longer act as monopolists in their respective markets and must take 
into account preferences of potential bidders. Moreover, the degree of participation in the 
initial auction is likely to have a positive effect on the liquidity of the secondary market. 
                                                                        
8
 See, for example, Engelbrecht-Wiggans, List, and Reiley (2006) and Bulow, and Klemperer (1996).  
9
Our results are consistent with the empirical investigation of Umlauf (1993) who examined Mexican T-bill 
auctions, with Feldman and Reinhart (1995) who studied the International Monetary Fund’s auction of gold 
and with Tenorio (1993) who studied Zambia’s weekly foreign exchange auctions. See also Nyborg and 
Sundaresan (1996), Malvey and Archibald (1998) and Goldreich (2007) for the U.S. experiment. 
10
 The experimental work by Goswami, Noe, and Rebello (1996) shows that discriminatory auctions yield 
higher proceeds than do uniform auctions. 
11
 See, for example, the evidence from Finland: “The introduction of the euro has boosted market volumes 
as well as numbers of active counterparties and final investors. Already during the first year of the euro, 
domestic banks lost much of their earlier dominant position as the share of foreign demand increased to 
75%, and the share is still increasing”, Salavirta and Taipalus (2003, pp 44). 
 8 
Our paper joins the strand of literature that uses both professionals and students in 
experimental/survey settings.12Within the context of financial market decision-making, 
several experimental papers have examined the choice of professional versus student 
subjects and found that the behavior of professional decision-makers does not 
qualitatively differ from that exhibited by the students.
13
  
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the hypotheses relating to 
bidders’ choice and discusses the design of the survey. In Section 3 we summarize and 
discuss the survey results. Section 4 provides concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Hypotheses and Survey Design 
2.1. Hypotheses about Bidders’ Choices 
 
As discussed above the existing theory does not provide us with a definitive 
answer regarding the pricing rule that an issuer of financial assets should choose in 
designing an auction. One possible alternative is to try to get a reading on the preferences 
of potential bidders. An experiment conducted by the U.S. Treasury between 1992 and 
1996 compared the two auction systems. The results (see Malvey, Archibald and Flynn 
(1995) and Malvey and Archibald (1998)) are marginally in favor of the uniform price 
mechanism when the total revenues generated by the two methods are compared. In the 
uniform price mechanism, the experiment also gave indications of wider participation and 
less concentration. 
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 Friedman and Sunder (1994) provide a detailed discussion on the choice of subjects for experimental 
economics and survey studies of different economic decisions.  
13
 See, for example,  DeJong, Forsythe and Uecker (1988), Dyer, Kagel and Levin (1989), Plott (1988) and 
Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988). 
 9 
The purpose of our study is to shed some light on the preference of potential 
market participants regarding the pricing mechanism in public auctions. Unable to 
measure these preferences directly from market data, and believing that they should have 
an impact on the propensity of investors to participate in auctions, we provide evidence 
obtained from surveys of potential bidders. These estimates are then entered into a model 
comparing the proceeds generated from uniform and discriminatory auctions, to render a 
more realistic analysis of how market design may affect the functioning of primary 
markets. 
     The first question to be addressed in the survey is whether in fact auction 
participants have a preference (or are they indifferent) to a specific type of pricing 
mechanism, be it uniform (UPA) or discriminatory (DA). Second, we tried to discover if 
the choice of mechanism affected bidding behavior. Is the bidding similar in either 
mechanisms or does one mechanism encourage more aggressive bidding? Third, we 
investigate the total impact of participation and bidding aggressiveness to find out if 
there is a significant difference in proceeds that the issuer collects. 
 
 
2.2  Survey Design 
2.2.1 Methodology 
The responses to the surveys, which were conducted among different groups in 
several countries, constitute our source of data.  Designing an effective survey is a 
challenging task since one needs to express a complicated realistic situation in a 
relatively short survey and elicit honest replies. We decided to adopt the experimental 
 10 
design of SSZ (2006) as the base case of our survey. This enables us to check the 
consistency of our survey ("one shot game") with a multi-round experiment. Moreover it 
enables us to check the consistency of the results of two methods, unpaid survey versus a 
paid lab experiment.
14
 In the design of the specific survey questions that are asked we 
used standard techniques to minimize potential biases. In addition, we applied IRB 
constraints. A copy of the survey is provided in Appendix A. 
In order to keep the identity of the participants confidential the survey does not 
ask for specific individual identification such as name, birth date, or social security 
number other than gender. Yet, in order to incorporate the potential impact of financial 
experience, particularly financial auction experience, we do ask questions about 
experience in financial markets and previous participation in financial auctions. 
 The first part of the survey describes the objectives of the research and provides a 
detailed example of the two auction mechanisms. The second part consists of the 
questionnaire, including questions regarding the participants’ experience. 
   
2.2.2 Survey Questions and the Main Example 
In our survey (see Appendix A) the participants were asked to imagine that the 
market consists of 10 participants and each participant can decide in which auction 
mechanism to participate.  As in reality, the decision of each member of the group affects 
the number of bidders that he or she will eventually be bidding against. In other words, if 
more participants will choose the uniform price mechanism the total amount of bidders 
that they will compete with in a given auction will be larger. The parameters of the 
problem are based on SSZ (2006), which is described below. 
                                                                        
14
 For an elaborate discussion on the effects of financial incentives on performance in experimental tasks 
see Camerer and Hogarth (1999). 
 11 
 In their study there are N = 5 bidders in each auction mechanism (5 in the uniform 
and 5 in the discriminatory) who compete for Q
 
= 26 units of a good.  The after-market 
value of a unit is known in advance and is equal to 20.
15
 Prices are discrete and the “tick 
size” is 1.  In particular, bids were submitted for quantity orders at 4 distinct prices 
contained in the set {17, 18, 19, 20}.  Quantities are in integers and the aggregate 
quantity demanded by each bidder is 26.  Each quantity order is an offer to purchase the 
specified number of units at a given price (or below in the case of the uniform-price 
auction). The stop-out price is determined as the highest price at which demand equals or 
exceeds the supply of Q = 26 units.  Winning bids are those submitted at or above the 
stop-out price.  All quantities demanded at prices strictly above the stop-out price are 
filled while orders bid at the stop-out price are rationed on a pro-rata basis.  
 Given this structure, SSZ (2006) describes the Nash equilibria of the one-shot 
auctions. While the uniform price mechanism supports multiple equilibria (at all possible 
prices), the discriminatory price mechanism supports only one equilibrium at the auction 
price of 19. 
            In our setting, the experimental design which allocates 5 bidders to each 
mechanism can be thought of as a special case where either all the 10 participants choose 
to be indifferent between the two auction mechanisms or 50% of them choose to 
participate in a uniform price mechanism and the other 50% choose the discriminatory 
price mechanism. It should be noted that the equlibria described in the case where 10 
players are divided into two groups of 5 each is not necessarily the equilibria obtained in 
                                                                        
15
 Since a known post-auction price was employed by SSZ (2006), there is a legitimate concern about this 
design decision. One motivation was to avoid the potential bidder bankruptcy, a factor we cannot control 
for in our survey. Another consideration was that, given a fairly liquid Treasury bond market, the 
reissuance of the same bonds occurs in a market with continuously observed prices. 
 12 
other possible division of the 10 players.  If, for example, only one participant decided to 
choose the uniform price mechanism, while the rest (9) decided to choose the 
discriminatory price mechanism, then the only equilibrium in the uniform price 
mechanism is 17.  
 In our survey the participants are presented with two identical firms which try to 
issue debt via an auction.  The only difference between the two firms is the auction 
mechanism; one firm opts for uniform pricing, while the other uses discriminatory 
pricing.
16
  
 We asked the participants which, if any, preference they have, or whether they are 
indifferent to the pricing mechanism. Given their choice, they were asked to submit a 
schedule of bids. We also asked them which mechanism (if any) they thought most of the 
other participants would choose. We did not reward the participants with monetary prizes 
and participation in the survey was strictly voluntary. In the control group from 2009 we 
also asked them, using the same initial survey, to write the reasons for their choice. 
 
  
2.2.3 Survey Sample 
We conducted the survey in six countries in 2004-2005.
17
 Our final sample 
consists of 220 participants. (USA (43.2%), Israel (22.7%), Switzerland (8.2%), 
Luxembourg (12.3%), Norway (7.7%) and South Africa (5.9%). The participants (see 
Table 1) consisted of bankers from South Africa attending a risk management course, 
                                                                        
16
 It is important to note that while the participants in our survey choose between two firms, we could have 
replaced the word “firm” with the word “country”. Since we wanted the participants to be unbiased by the 
common practice of their own home country, we chose firms as the auctioning (offering) entity. 
17
 We excluded a few cases of participants that either did not respond to the question of mechanism choice, 
did not submit bids, or submitted bids for more than 26 units from the sample. 
 13 
financial professionals from one of the leading financial institutions in Israel, business 
undergraduates from the USA, MBA students from the USA, Israel, Luxemburg and 
Switzerland, as well as executive MBA students, primarily financial professionals, from 
Israel and Norway.
18
  
The participants in our sample have on average 2.33 years of experience in 
financial markets (the maximum is 25 and the minimum is zero). 11.4% indicated that 
they had previously participated in financial asset auctions. Given the strand of literature 
that argues that gender may have an affect on various aspects of the decision making 
process, we also controlled for gender. Our sample included 21.8% female subjects.  
We also conducted a robustness test (March, 2009) among risk managers in a 
major bank and an insurance company in the Netherlands and among Executive MBA 
students in Luxembourg with work experience in banks and financial institutions. 
Altogether, 22 students answered the questionnaire. This is our control group. 
 
3. Analysis of the Findings 
3.1 Choice of Pricing Mechanism 
  The first major finding is that 91% of the participants indicated a definite 
preference for a given pricing mechanism. 65.5% of those with a preference chose to 
participate in the uniform price auction. This finding persisted across countries and across 
types of education/professional experience (Executive MBA versus MBA versus 
Undergraduates). (See Table 1 for detailed results). In other words, the majority of the 
participants in each country and in each education group preferred uniform pricing.    
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 Many of the students in the classes in Switzerland and Luxembourg are citizen of other countries such as 
Germany, France, Belgium and Holland.  
 14 
            What may affect bidders' choice? Some of the potential factors are 
information/knowledge, risk preference, behavioral biases, culture, or strategic behavior.  
As a proxy for information / knowledge we asked the participants to indicate the years of 
work experience in financial markets and if they had prior experience in   financial 
auctions. Since there is indication in the academic literature that risk attitudes is related to 
gender and risk attitude may affect the mechanism choice, we also gathered information 
on the gender of the participants.  As a proxy for potential culture difference we control 
for  the US versus other countries where the survey took place. 
                Table 2 presents the univariate relationship between, gender, length of work 
experience in the financial industry and exposure to financial auctions to the chosen 
mechanism. Those preferring uniform pricing have, on average (p=0.057), greater 
professional experience in the financial industry than those favoring discriminatory 
pricing (2.7, and 1.8 years respectively). While the proportion of those that had previous 
exposure to financial auctions is higher among the group preferring discriminatory 
pricing, the difference is not significant. Neither gender nor location (i.e. most surveys 
that were conducted in the US) was statistically significant.  
 To investigate this question further in a multivariate context we estimated the 
following logit (probit) equations on the sample of participants who had a specific 
preference (“not indifferent”) and answered all the essential questions (n=194):19,20 
  
UPM =  + 1YE + 2Dummy(AE)                                                           (1) 
                                                                        
19
 We also conducted a multinomial logit test that included the ”indifferent” group   The results were 
essentially the same.  
20
 In five cases the participants did not indicate the years of experience. They were excluded from the 
analysis. 
 15 
 
UPM =  + 1YE + 2Dummy(AE) + 3 Dummy(G) +Dummy (US)      (2) 
 
Where: 
UPM (Uniform Price Mechanism) is a dummy variable that gets the value 1 if the 
participant chooses the uniform price mechanism and 0 if the participant chooses the 
discriminatory price mechanism. 
YE is years of experience that the participant has in the financial industry. 
Dummy (AE) is a dummy variable that gets the value 1 if the participant has experience 
with financial asset auctions. 
Dummy (G) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the participant is a female and 0 if he is 
a male  
Dummy (US) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the survey was done in the US and 0 
elsewhere. 
 The results obtained from estimating the above logit (probit) equations are 
consistent with the univariate analysis as follows: From equation (1) we find that the 
preference for the uniform price mechanism is positively correlated with years of 
financial market experience but it is barely significant (p=0.08 for the logit and 0.07 for 
the probit). Exposure to financial asset auctions has a non-significant negative correlation 
with auction choice. The pseudo R- square is rather low (0.017 for the logit and 0.018 for 
the probit) indicating that we are explaining a very small part of the variation in the 
auction choice. The basic result and the explanatory power of the model do not change 
 16 
when we add a dummy for gender or a dummy for the US location as control variables 
(equation 2).
21
 These two control variables were both insignificant. 
 We next divided the sample of participants into three groups according to their 
reported years of experience in the financial markets: The first group reported no 
experience in financial markets (n= 104), the second group is the group that reported 
experience of up to (including) 2 years (n= 32) and the last group is the group that 
reported experience of more than 2 years (n= 78). Figure 1 shows the preference of the 
participants for each of the three groups. Though all three groups show a preference for 
the uniform mechanism, the relatively strongest support for this mechanism is provided 
by the participants who reported to have financial market experience of over two years.
22
  
 
3.2 Bidding Startegy 
                         After observing that most bidders prefer the uniform price mechanism, 
the next question we examined was whether there is a difference in the bidding strategy 
among those that prefer uniform pricing compared with those that prefer discriminatory 
pricing and how that is translated to the revenue  obtained by the issuer.   
 We find that not only do most bidders prefer uniform pricing, they are also 
willing to bid more aggressively under the uniform price mechanism. The weighted 
average (by quantity demanded) of the price submitted by bidders that chose the uniform 
price mechanism is 18.72 while the weighted average of the price submitted by bidders 
that chose the discriminatory price mechanism is 18.59. This result is statistically 
significant at the 10% level and is consistent with the finding of SSZ (2006). 
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 The P value of the chi-square test for the model is also insignificant. 
22
 It is interesting to note that the preference for the uniform mechanism is only slightly greater than for the 
discriminatory mechanism among those that have approximately two-years work experience. 
 17 
 To test whether the difference between the weighted average price that was bid in 
the two auctions is statistically significant, while controlling for relevant variables, we 
use the following Tobit regression
23
 
 
AP= + 1YE + 2 Dummy(AE) + 3 Dummy(G) + 4Dummy(UPM)+4 Dummy(DPM) 
 
Where:  
AP is the weighted average of the price submitted by bidders calculated as: 
  
AP =  




20,19,18,17
20,19,18,17
*
i
i
Qi
Qii
        Where Qi represents the quantity demanded at that price. 
 
Dummy (UPM) is a dummy variable that receives the value 1 if the participant chose the 
uniform price mechanism and 0 if the participant chose the discriminatory price 
mechanism or was indifferent. Dummy (DPM) is a dummy variable that receives the 
value 1 if the participant chose the discriminatory price mechanism and 0 if the 
participant chose the uniform price mechanism or was indifferent. YE is the amount of 
experience in round years that the participant had in the financial industry. Dummy (AE) 
is a dummy variable that receives the value of 1 if the participant had experience with 
financial assets auctions. Dummy (G) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the participant 
was a female and 0 if he was a male. Dummy (US) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the survey was done in the US and 0 elsewhere. 
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 We use Tobit since the bidding prices in the survey are limited to the range between 17 and 20. 
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  The only significant variable at the 10% level (P=0.07) is UPM and its coefficient 
is positive, which gives additional support to the hypothesis that those opting for the 
uniform price mechanism bid more aggressively on average. 
 In order to investigate which mechanism will yield greater proceeds to the issuer, 
given the participants’ choices, we randomly assigned the 220 participants answers to 
twenty two groups of ten each. In each group we divided the participants’ answers 
according to their mechanism choice; either discriminatory or uniform. Participants 
expressing indifference between the two mechanisms were randomly assigned. We 
calculated the auction price for the two mechanisms for each of the 22 groups. On 
average, the uniform price mechanism leads to significantly higher proceeds when 
compared to the discriminatory price mechanism (t=2.95 paired test). Consistent with 
SSZ (2006) we also find that there is higher variation in the proceeds obtained under the 
uniform price mechanism than under the discriminatory price mechanism. Table 3 shows 
the proceeds for each of the 22 groups. In most groups the uniform bids resulted in much 
higher proceeds (14 out of 22 groups). In thirteen cases the uniform bids actually yielded 
the highest possible proceeds of 520. The highest proceeds for the discriminatory bidders 
was 514 . 
 
3.3 What Drives Bidders Preferences? 
  What is driving our results? Do bidders project correctly choices of other 
bidders? In our survey we asked the participants which method will be mostly chosen by 
others? About 20% of our sample did not answer this question. Hence the relevant 
sample decreased to 175. Out of them 10.3% predicted that most participants will be 
 19 
indifferent, 66.3 % predicted that most participants will choose the uniform price 
mechanism and 23.4% predicted that most participants will choose the discriminatory 
price mechanism. Overall, the predictions of our participants were in line with the actual 
responses. Most thought that the majority will choose the uniform price mechanism and 
in fact, most did. It is interesting to note that 76.6% of the participants thought that most 
participants will choose the same mechanism that they chose. It is an interesting 
observation because participating in the mechanism that most players choose is not 
necessarily an optimal choice. 
 While focusing on the bidders' choice one may ask how our survey results fit into 
the paradigm of a general equilibrium. In a world with open financial markets and 
(relatively) free access to a variety of different auctions of close substitutes, shouldn’t 
there be some kind of an irrelevance result that applies to any country? Under this 
paradigm, if bidders are rational and only concerned with paying the lowest price they 
will look for the best value across auctions taking into account their ability to extract 
rents from the seller and the anticipated participation in each auction. 
      To learn more about what drives bidders preferences we conducted 2 additional  
surveys with different groups in the early months of 2009. The first group that consisted 
of 13 risk managers in a major bank and an insurance company in the Netherlands and 
the second that consisted of 14 Executive MBA students in Luxembourg with work 
experience in banks and financial institutions. In addition to the questions presented 
before, the two groups were explicitly asked to answer why they chose a particular 
mechanism. Not all participant were willing to disclose their mechanism choice (4 did 
not). Of those that did, the majority chose the uniform price mechanism. We got varied 
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responses from those that picked the uniform price mechanism (equality of the price, risk, 
clarity of the mechanism and the luck of the winner curse)  and we could not single out a 
clearly dominant reason that explains the mechanism choice. Our results, admittedly on a 
relatively limited sample, are consistent with the previous literature, and suggest that 
although price plays a major role in the preference of the uniform mechanism, it seems 
that there are other considerations as well. For example, the uniform price mechanism is 
associated with "fairness".  
 In designing the initial survey we focused on documenting the subjects' actions and 
demographic differences rather than asking their opinions and reasoning for their actions.  
We made this experimental choice in order to avoid some of the biases that may occurs in 
the responses answers otherwise. Only in the control group we also asked the subjects for 
the reasoning for their choices. What is clear from our exercise is that eventhough 
different bidders are driven by different reasons, such as fairness, complexity of the 
market or the illusion of expertise, the outcome is consistent with bidders preference for 
the uniform price mechanism.  
  
 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
 Most governments and some corporations use auctions when offering securities 
and other financial assets to the public. The most common types of auctions for financial 
assets are based on either a uniform or a discriminatory (multiple) pricing mechanism. 
Existing theoretical and empirical work is ambivalent about which method is optimal for 
issuers.  Experiments designed to compare the two mechanisms examine the impact of 
the auction’s structure on pricing assume, however, that the level of investor participation 
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under each pricing system will be equal.  This assumption does not necessarily reflect 
market reality.  In many cases investors are not indifferent to the structural aspects of the 
auction. In order to more accurately compare between pricing mechanisms, the 
propensity of bidders to participate must be factored into experimental models. We 
propose a method for incorporating bidder preference into comparative models for 
auction pricing.  
 For the first time in the academic literature this paper provides survey evidence on 
the preference that potential bidders may have regarding uniform and discriminatory 
pricing. We surveyed over 200 financial professionals, executives and business students 
in order to learn about their preferences between the two auction mechanisms. Our survey 
revealed that an overwhelming majority of potential participants are not indifferent 
between auction mechanisms and the majority prefer uniform pricing. The only variable 
that we found to be positively correlated to the choice of auction mechanism is years of 
experience in financial markets. Other factors, such as country of origin, education level 
(undergraduate versus MBA versus executive MBA), previous exposure to financial 
auctions and gender had no bearing on bidder preference. 
       Our study documents that a majority of bidders preferred uniform pricing
24
. Though 
several countries have recently changed their auction method, from discriminatory to 
uniform, most countries are still employing discriminatory pricing (See Brenner Galai 
and Sade (2007)). Though the evidence from the experiment conducted by the U.S. 
treasury in 1992 was not significant with regard to the revenue generation, it did show 
that uniform pricing leads to greater dispersion among primary dealers which may be an 
                                                                        
24
 Though it has been shown that in  indivisible good UPAs,  bidders  end up paying more than the average 
bidder in DAs , bidders may prefer UPAs since it is a less risky and more defensible strategy. 
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important factor in promoting the liquidity of secondary markets. In wake of the 
experiment the U.S. Treasury shifted to uniform pricing in all their bond issues. Our 
survey provides evidence consistent with the US experiment and suggests that issuers, 
including sovereign governments, seeking broader-based participation in securities 
auctions, should consider using the uniform price mechanism.  
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Table 1 
Bidders Choices between the Auction Methods 
This table summarizes the responses of participants in a survey conducted during 2004 
and 2005. Participants specify the location, academic institution, type of education or  
occupation. “Month and Year” specifies the date the survey was conducted. “Number” 
indicates the qualified answers from this sub-group. “ %Uniform” denotes the percentage 
of the qualified answers preferring uniform pricing, while “% Discriminatory” indicates 
the percentage of the qualified answers preferring discriminatory pricing  and “% 
Indifferent” indicates the percentage of the qualified answers stating indifference between 
the two alternative price mechanisms. 
  
Participants Month and 
Year 
Number %  
Uniform 
% Discriminatory %  
Indifferent  
Executive MBA and 
Executive Courses 
     
Israel-Hebrew U- 
Executive MBA-
Finance 
June 2004 
and 
April 2005 
18 55.56% 38.89% 5.56% 
South Africa-Bankers  June 2004 13 46.15% 30.77% 23.08% 
Norway – Executive 
MBA at BI 
May 2005 17 76.47% 17.65% 5.88% 
MBA      
Luxembourg - School 
of Finance 
February 
2004 
and January 
2005 
27 70.37% 25.93% 3.70% 
 Switzerland -
Lausanne-MBA 
Finance 
May 2004 18 50.00% 33.33% 16.67% 
Israel – Hebrew U – 
Advanced MBA - 
Finance  
November 
2004 
10 40.00% 60.00% 0.00% 
NYU- -MBA 2-3 
year part time MBA 
December 
2004 
24 66.67% 20.83% 12.5% 
NYU- full time 2
nd
 
year MBA 
December 
2004 
40 62.50% 32.50% 5.00% 
NYU- 2
nd
 year MBA-
Investment Banking, 
Business & Law 
School 
December 
2004 
19 52.63% 31.58% 15.79% 
Advanced 
Undergraduate 
     
NYU-Business 
Undergraduate- – 
Seniors 
December 
2004 
12 41.67% 33.33% 25.00% 
Professionals      
Financial 
professionals from a 
leading financial 
January 
2005 
22 63.64% 36.36% 0.00% 
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institution in Israel 
      
TOTAL  220  90.91% 9.09% 
TOTAL  220 59.55% 31.36% 9.09% 
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Table 2 
Univariate Analysis – Bidders Characteristics and Preferences 
This table summarizes the descriptive statistics of participant responses to a survey 
conducted during 2004 and 2005 according to mechanism of choice.  
 
 Uniform Discriminatory 
Mean - Years of 
Financial Work 
Experience 
2.72* 1.79*
25
 
Median – Years of 
Financial Work 
Experience 
0.67 0.25 
% of Female 22% 25% 
% of Previous 
Financial Auctions 
Experience 
11% 14% 
% of US Responses 43% 41% 
* indicates that the variable is statistically significant at 10% confidence level (the p-value of the t-test was 
calculated assuming unequal variance and a two tail test.) 
                                                                        
25
 P-value equals 0.057 
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Table 3 
Proceeds for Each Random Group for Uniform and Discriminatory 
Bidders 
“U” and “D” denote proceeds from the simulated uniform and discriminatory price 
auctions respectively. “U-D” represents the difference in proceeds obtained under the 
uniform price mechanism versus those obtained under discriminatory pricing.  “Avg” 
indicates the average of each of the variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market U D U-D 
1 520 508 12 
2 520 481 39 
3 494 507 -13 
4 520 494 26 
5 520 495 25 
6 520 494 26 
7 520 478 42 
8 520 496 24 
9 520 495 25 
10 520 494 26 
11 494 497 -3 
12 494 496 -2 
13 520 494 26 
14 494 494 0 
15 520 500 20 
16 494 513 -19 
17 520 504 16 
18 494 514 -20 
19 494 495 -1 
20 494 499 -5 
21 520 505 15 
22 494 495 -1 
AVG 509.36 497.64 11.73 
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Figure 1 
Mechanism Preference and Experience in Financial Markets  
 
Figure 1 describes the distribution of choices of the participants among the pricing 
mechanism as a function of their years of work experience in the financial markets. “No 
Experience” represents the group of participant with no work experience in the financial 
markets. “Up to (including) Two Years” represents the group of participants that have 
positive work experience in financial markets that is less than (including) two years. 
“Above Two Years” represents the group of participants with above two years of work 
experience in financial markets. 
0.00%
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20.00%
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 Appendix A – Survey Submitted to Individuals 
 
Professor Dan Galai and Dr. Orly Sade from the Finance Department at the School of 
Business Administration, Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Professor Menachem 
Brenner from the Finance department at New York University Stern School of Business  
are conducting academic research in an attempt to better understand auction design 
mechanism. For the purpose of this research we would like you to answer a few 
questions. Everything contained in these instructions and everything you hear in this 
session is an accurate representation of this research. Be sure to ask any questions that 
you may have during the instruction period, and ask for assistance, if needed, at any 
time. All subjects receive the same instructions. (no minors are allowed to participate). 
 
Your identity will be confidential with regard to the participation in this study. The 
survey does not ask for specific individual identification. The survey responses will be 
combined, and results will be presented only in aggregated form. Participation in this 
study is strictly voluntary. Omitting answers to specific questions is at the participant's 
discretion.  
 
 
 
This Survey includes: 
 
1. Case description 
2. Examples 
3. Survey 
 
1. Case Description: 
 
Two identical firms decided to issue bonds and to sell them via auctions. Each of the 
firms is going to sell 26 units. The economic value of each of the bonds in the secondary 
market is known with certainty and is equal to 20. The minimum price that can be 
submitted in the auction is 17. Bids can be made only in integers. Each participant can 
participate only in one of the auctions. The only difference between the two firms is the 
auction mechanism that is used: Firm “A” uses uniform price auction while firm “B” uses 
discriminatory (pay your bid) price auction. Each participant can bid for 26 units at most. 
 
 
Firm “A” 
This firm is going to issue bonds and sell them via “Uniform Price Auction” 
The Auction Method: 
There will be 26 units available for sale. You can submit bids for up to 26 units. Your 
resale value for each unit is 20. (This means that after the auction your profit will be 20 
for each unit that you hold, less what you paid for each unit). Prior to the auction, you are 
required to submit a schedule of bids. This schedule indicates the number of units you are 
willing to buy (including zero units) at each possible price level. The possible price levels 
will be 17, 18, 19, and 20. The sum of all of your bids may not exceed 26 units.  
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Once all participants have submitted their bids, the auctioneer will calculate the highest 
price at which all 26 bonds can be sold and will allocate units to players that submit bids 
that are equal to or higher than this price (if needed, the units will be allocated 
proportionally to the units demanded at the clearing price). The price paid for each 
bond will be equal to the clearing price. The market-clearing price will be the 
highest price at which the total demand for bonds summed across all bidders is 
equal to 26. If the total demand will be smaller than 26 at any of the suggested prices, the 
maximum total demand will be sold. A numerical example that illustrates this type of 
auction will be presented. 
  
 
Firm “B” 
This firm is going to issue bonds and sell them via “Discriminatory (Pay Your Bid) Price 
Auction” 
The Auction Method: 
There will be 26 units available for sale. You can submit bids for up to 26 units. Your 
resale value for each unit is 20. (This means that after the auction your profit will be 20 
francs for each unit that you hold, less what you paid for each unit). Prior to the auction, 
you are required to submit a schedule of bids. This schedule indicates the number of units 
you are willing to buy (including zero units) at each possible price level. The possible 
price levels will be 17, 18, 19, and 20. The sum of all of your bids may not exceed 26 
units.  
Once all participants have submitted their schedule of bids, the auctioneer will calculate 
the highest price at which all 26 bonds can be sold, and will allocate units to players that 
submit bids that are equal to or higher than this price (if needed, the units will be 
allocated proportionally to the units demanded at the clearing price). The price you pay 
for each unit you receive, is equal to the price that you bid for that particular unit. 
This means that it is possible that you will pay different prices for the bonds you buy, and 
it is possible that different bidders will receive bonds at different prices. If the total 
demand will be smaller than 26 at any of the suggested prices, the maximum total 
demand will be sold. A numerical example that illustrates this type of auction will be 
presented.  
 
 
You will randomly be assigned to a group that contains 10 participants, you will not 
know in advance who are the members of your group. You must choose your preferred 
auction mechanism. Then, you will participate in the chosen mechanism and submit your 
bids accordingly. At the time that you submit your bids you will not know how many of 
your group members decided to play the type of auction as you have decided upon.  
 
The number of units allocated to you and the price per unit will be determined based on 
the results of the auction mechanism of your choice and the bids submitted for that 
mechanism by members of your group.  
The profits are calculated as: number of bonds purchased * 20 – total purchase cost 
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      2.   Examples 
The following examples are for illustration purposes only. They are not intended to be 
suggested as “best” strategies and simply demonstrate the implications of a possible set 
of actions. 
 
In the examples, for simplicity, we assume that 5 participants decided to choose the 
Uniform Price Auction and 5 participants decided to choose the Discriminatory Price 
Auction.  
 
 2.1 Results for the Uniform Price auction 
 
Uniform Price Auction Example 
(Numbers in the table are units) 
 
 Participants Demand Aggregate 
Demand 
 
 
Aggregate 
Demand 
Supply 
Price A B C D E 
20 11 0 5 0 0 16 16 26 
19 5 0 3 2 0 10 26 26 
18 5 0 8 6 18 37 63 26 
17 5 26 10 18 8 67 130 26 
  
The demand at each price is the sum of the demands of bidders A, B, C, D, and E. For 
example the demand at price 20 is equal to  .16  =11+0+5+0+0  The aggregate 
demand is equal to the total demand at that price and all higher prices. For example the 
aggregate demand at the price of 19 is 26: (Demand at 20) + (Demand at 19) = 26 units. 
The clearing price is the highest price at which the cumulative demand equals the supply. 
In this case, the cumulative demand equals the supply at price equal 19. 
 
The allocations in units and profits of the participants is as follows: 
 
   Participants   
Price A B C D E 
Allocation 16 0 8 2 0 
Profit 16*(20-19)=16 0 8*(20-19)=8 2*(20-19)=2 0 
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Since the resale value of the bond for each player is 20, each player makes a positive 
profit for each unit that he/she buys at a price below 20. The equilibrium price is 19 
hence each player will profit one for each unit allocated. 
 
2.1 Results for the Discriminatory Price auction 
 
Discriminatory Price Auction Example 
(Numbers in the table are units) 
 
 
 Participants Demand Aggregate 
Demand 
 
 
Aggregate 
Demand 
Supply 
Price A B C D E 
20 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 26 
19 20 0 3 2 0 25 26 26 
18 0 0 13 6 18 37 63 26 
17 5 26 10 18 8 67 130 26 
  
The demand at each price is the sum of the demands of bidders A, B, C, D, and E. For 
example the demand at price 20 is equal to   .1  =1+0+0+0+ The aggregate demand 
is  equal to the total demand at that price and all higher prices. For example the aggregate 
demand at the price of 19 is 26: (Demand at 20) + (Demand at 19) = 26 units. The 
clearing price is the highest price at which the cumulative demand equals the supply. In 
this case, the cumulative demand equals the supply at price equal 19. 
 
     The allocations and profits of the participants are as follows: 
 
   Participants   
Price A B C D E 
Allocation 21 0 3 2 0 
Profit 1*0+20*1=20 0 1*3=3 2*1=2 0 
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Since the resale value of the bond for each player is 20, each player makes a positive 
profit for each unit that he/she buys at a price below 20. Player A receives one unit that 
he demanded at price 20 and pays 20 for it, and receives 20 units at price 19, and hence 
his profit is 20. 
 
Questionnaire 
 
1. I choose to participate in the auction of firm: (circle the appropriate answer) 
a. “A” Uniform Price Mechanism 
b. “B” Discriminatory Price Mechanism 
c. I am totally indifferent between participating in each of the two 
mechanisms 
d. I prefer not to participate in any of the suggested mechanism. 
 
If your answer is either a or b please continue to question number 3 if your answer is c 
please continue to question 2 and if your answer is d please continue to question 4. 
 
2. Please randomly select between the mechanisms. Your random selection is 
__________________ 
 
Now continue to question 3 
 
3. My bids are: 
 
Quantity Demanded Price 
 20 
 19 
 18 
 17 
 
4. I believe that most of the participant will choose: A / B / indifferent 
 
5. Gender: 
 
a. Female 
b. Male 
 
6. Did you ever participate in financial assets’ auction? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
7. Years of work experience in financial markets_______________ 
